CHALLENGE OF THE SENTENCE
1° COMPLAINT OF NULLITY AGAINST THE SENTENCE
If it is a case concerning only private persons, the nullity of acts which is established by law and which, although known to the party making the plaint, was not raised with the judge before the sentence, is sanated by the sentence itself, without prejudice to cann. 1303 and 1304.
§ 1. A sentence is vitiated by irremediable nullity if:
1° it was rendered by a judge who is absolutely incompetent;
2° it was rendered by a person who lacks the power of judging in the tribunal in which the case was settled;
3° the judge passed the sentence under duress from force or grave fear;
4° the trial was instituted without the judicial petition mentioned in can. 1104, §2, or was not instituted against some respondent;
5° it was rendered between parties at least one of whom did not have standing in court;
6° one person acted in the name of another without a lawful mandate;
7° the right of defence was denied to one or other party;
8° it did not settle the controversy even partially.
§ 2. In these cases, a plaint of nullity can be lodged in perpetuity by means of an exception, or within ten years of the date of the intimation of the sentence by means of an action before the judge who delivered the sentence.
§ 1. A sentence is vitiated by remediable nullity only, if:
1° it was rendered by an illegitimate number of judges contrary to the prescription of can. 1084;
2° it does not contain the motives, that is, the reasons for the decision;
3° it lacks the signatures prescribed by law;
4° it does not contain reference to the year, month, day and place in which it was pronounced;
5° it is based on a judicial act which is null and whose nullity was not sanated according to the norm of can. 1302;
6° it was rendered against a party who was legitimately absent as provided for in can. 1273, § 2.
§ 2. In these cases, a plaint of nullity can be lodged within three months from the intimation of the sentence.
The judge who pronounced the sentence hears the plaint of its nullity. If the party fears that this judge is biased and so is suspected, a substitute judge can be demanded in accordance with the norm of can. 1108.
A plaint of nullity can be proposed together with an appeal within the time determined for an appeal.
§ 1. Not only the parties who feel themselves aggrieved can file a plaint of nullity but also the promoter of justice or the defender of the bond whenever they have the right to intervene.
§ 2. A judge can ex officio retract or amend an invalid sentence which he has pronounced, within the time period for acting set by cann. 1303, § 2 and 1304, § 2, unless meanwhile an appeal together with a plaint of nullity has been filed.
Cases concerning a plaint of nullity can be dealt with in accordance with the norms for the summary contentious trial.
2° THE APPEAL
The party who feels aggrieved by a given sentence and likewise the promoter of justice and the defender of the bond in cases in which their presence is required, have the right to appeal from a sentence to a higher judge, with due regard for the prescription of can. 1310.
There is no room for appeal:
1° from a sentence of the Roman Pontiff himself or of the Apostolic Signatura;
2° from a sentence vitiated by nullity unless it is joined with a plaint of nullity according to the norm of can. 1306;
3° from a sentence which has become an adjudged matter;
4 ° from the decree of a judge or an interlocutory sentence which does not have the force of a definitive sentence, unless it is joined with an appeal from a definitive sentence;
5° from a sentence or from a decree in a case in which the law provides for settlement of the matter most expeditiously.
§ 1. The appeal must be lodged with the judge who pronounced the sentence, within the peremptory time limit of fifteen usable days from the intimation of the sentence.
§ 2. If it is made orally, the notary is to put it in writing in the presence of the appellant.
There is no appeal from the delegate to the person who delegated him or her but to the immediate superior of the delegate, unless it is the Apostolic See that has delegated.
If a question arises about the right of appeal, the appellate tribunal is to determine it most expeditiously, in accordance with the canons about the summary contentious trial.
An appeal must be prosecuted within a month of its being filed before the judge to whom it is directed, unless the judge from whom appeal is made has set a longer period of time to the party for the prosecution.
§ 1. To pursue the appeal, it is required and is sufficient that the party request the ministry of the higher judge to amend the sentence that has been challenged, enclosing a copy of the sentence and indicating the reasons for the appeal.
§ 2. Meanwhile the judge from whom the appeal is being made must transmit the acts, duly authenticated by the notary, to the higher tribunal; if the acts are written in a language unknown to the appellate tribunal they are to be carefully translated into a language known to the tribunal and authenticated.
If the deadline for appeal either before the judge from whom the appeal is being made or before the judge to whom the appeal is directed has passed without result, the appeal is considered abandoned.
§ 1. The appellant can renounce the appeal with the effects mentioned in can. 1206.
§ 2. If the appeal was proposed by the defender of the bond or the promoter of justice, it can be renounced by the defender of the bond or the promoter of justice of the appellate tribunal unless the law provides otherwise.
§ 1. An appeal lodged by the plaintiff also benefits the respondent and vice versa.
§ 2. If there are several respondents or plaintiffs, and if the sentence is challenged by only one or against only one of them, the challenge is considered made by all of them and against all of them whenever the matter sought is indivisible or it is a joint obligation.
§ 3. If an appeal is filed by one party regarding one part of the sentence, the other party can place an incidental appeal regarding the other parts within a peremptory time period of fifteen days from the date of being notified of the principal appeal even though the deadline for an appeal has expired.
§ 4. Unless there is evidence to the contrary, it is permitted that an appeal is made against all parts of a sentence.
An appeal suspends the execution of a sentence.
§ 1. With due regard for the prescription of can. 1369, a new basis for petitioning may not be admitted at the appellate level not even by way of helpful cumulation; consequently, the joinder of the issue can focus only on whether the prior sentence is to be confirmed or revised, either totally or partially.
§ 2. Moreover, new proofs are admitted only in accordance with the norm of can. 1283.
The procedure at the appeal grade is, with appropriate adjustments, the same as in the first grade. Unless the proofs are to be completed, immediately after the joinder of the issue, the case is to be discussed and the sentence delivered.
RES IUDICATA; RESTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM
AND THE OPPOSITION OF A THIRD PARTY
1° RES IUDICATA
Without prejudice to can. 1324, an adjudged matter occurs:
1° if there are two conforming sentences between the same parties about the same matter and on the same grounds;
2° if no appeal was made against the sentence within usable time;
3° if at the appellate grade, the instance of the suit has been abated or renounced;
4° if a definitive sentence has been pronounced from which there is no appeal.
§ 1. An adjudged matter possesses stability of law so it can only be challenged by a plaint of nullity, total reinstatement or the opposition of a third party.
§ 2. An adjudged matter has the effect of law between the parties; it gives the right to an action arising from the sentence and to an exception of an adjudged matter. To prevent the introduction of the same case anew, the judge can even declare such an exception ex officio.
Cases concerning the status of persons, including those concerning the separation of spouses, never become an adjudged matter.
§ 1. If two conforming sentences have been given in a case concerning the status of persons, recourse to a tribunal of appeal can be made at any time, if new and serious proofs or arguments are brought forward within the peremptory time period of thirty days from the proposed challenge. However, within a month from the presentation of the new proofs and arguments, the appellate tribunal must settle by decree whether a new presentation of the case must be admitted or not.
§ 2. An appeal to a higher tribunal to obtain a new presentation of the case does not suspend the execution of the sentence, unless either the law provides otherwise or the appellate tribunal orders its suspension, in accordance with the norm of can. 1337, § 3.
2° RESTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM
§ 1. Against a judgement which has become an adjudged matter there can be a total reinstatement, provided it is clearly established that the judgement was unjust.
§ 2. That the judgement was unjust, however, is not considered clearly established unless:
1° the sentence is so based on proofs which are later discovered to be false so that without those proofs the dispositive section of the sentence would not be sustained;
2° afterwards, documents have been found which undoubtedly prove new facts which demand a contrary decision;
3° the sentence was pronounced because of the fraud of one party which harmed the other;
4° a prescription of the law which is not merely procedural has been evidently neglected;
5° the sentence is contrary to a preceding sentence which has become an adjudged matter.
§ 1. The total reinstatement for the reasons mentioned in can. 1326, § 2, nn. 1 – 3 must be sought from the judge who issued the sentence, within three months to be computed from the date of one\’s becoming aware of the reasons.
§ 2. The total reinstatement for the reasons mentioned in can. 1326, § 2, nn. 4 and 5 must be sought from the appellate tribunal within three months from the intimation of the sentence; but if, in the case mentioned in can. 1326, § 2, n. 5, notification of the preceding decision is had later, the time limits runs from this notification.
§ 3. The time limits mentioned above do not expire as long as the injured person is a minor.
§ 1. A petition of a total reinstatement suspends the execution of a sentence if the execution has not yet begun.
§ 2. If, however, from probable indications there is a suspicion that the petition has been made in order to delay the execution of the sentence, the judge can decree that the sentence be executed but with due caution being taken to indemnify the person seeking a total reinstatement if it is granted.
If a total reinstatement is granted, the judge must pronounce on the merits of the case.
3° OPPOSITION OF A THIRD PARTY
Those who fear that their rights could be harmed by a definitive judgement which has been pronounced in a case of other parties, and which may be executed, can challenge the judgement before its execution.
§ 1. The opposition by the third party can be had either by requiring the revision of the judgement by the tribunal that emanated it, or by deferring to the appellate tribunal.
§ 2. If the petition has been admitted and the opposer pleads in the appellate instance, he or she is bound by the norms on appeals; if before the tribunal that emanated the judgement, the norms for the judicial definition of incidental cases must be followed.
§ 1. The opposer in either case must prove that his or her right has been truly harmed or is going to be harmed.
§ 2. The harm must derive from the judgement itself in as much as it is itself the cause of the harm or, if executed, it is going to be gravely prejudicial to the opposer.
If the opposer proves his or her right, the judgement emanated earlier must be reformed by the tribunal in accordance with the petition of the opposer.
GRATUITOUS LEGALS ASSISTANCE
AND JUDICIAL EXPENSES
Poor people who are altogether unable to meet the court costs have the right to free legal aid; those who cannot pay the full costs, to a reduction of payment of the expenses.
The statutes of the tribunal must determine norms regarding:
1° the payment or reimbursement of judicial expenses by the parties;
2° the remuneration for procurators, advocates, and interpreters, and the indemnity of witnesses;
3° the granting of free legal aid or the reduction of expenses;
4° the reparation of damages owed by a person who not only lost the case, but was rash in going to litigation;
5° the money to be deposited, or the guarantee to be given, for the payment of expenses and the reparation of damages.
Against the pronouncement regarding the expenses, the remuneration and the damages there is no separate appeal; but the party can have recourse within fifteen days to the same judge who can adjust the assessment.
THE EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE
§ 1. A sentence which has become an adjudged matter can be executed with due regard for the prescription of can. 1328.
§ 2. The judge who rendered the sentence and also the appellate judge if an appeal has been filed, can ex officio or at the request of a party order a provisional execution of a sentence which has not yet become an adjudged matter after having arranged, if the case warrants, for the rendering of appropriate guarantees if there is question of provisions or payments for necessary sustenance or if some other just cause is pressing.
§ 3. On the other hand if the sentence mentioned is challenged and if the judge who must take cognizance of the challenge sees that it is probably well founded and irreparable harm could arise from the execution of the sentence, the judge can suspend its execution or subject it to a safeguard.
There can be no execution of a sentence prior to an executory decree of the judge in which it is stated that the sentence must be executed; this decree is to be included in the text of the sentence or issued separately, according to the different types of cases.
If the execution of the sentence demands a prior rendering of accounts, it is an incidental question which must be decided by the judge who passed the sentence ordering the execution.
§ 1. Unless particular law of a Church sui iuris determines otherwise, the eparchial bishop of the eparchy in which the first grade sentence was rendered, must execute the sentence personally or through another.
§ 2. If he refuses or neglects to do so, the execution belongs to the authority to which the appellate tribunal is subject, at the request of an interested party or ex officio.
§ 3. In cases of can. 1069, § 1 the execution of a sentence belongs to the superior determined by the statutes or typicon.
§ 1. Unless something is left to the discretion of the executor in the text of the sentence, the executor must execute the sentence according to the obvious meaning of the words.
§ 2. The executor may consider exceptions regarding the manner and force of the execution but not regarding the merits of the case; but if it has been discovered from other sources that the sentence is invalid or manifestly unjust according to the norm of cann. 1303, 1304 and 1326, § 2 the executor is to refrain from executing it, refer the matter to the tribunal which issued the sentence, and inform the parties.
§ 1. If a thing has been adjudicated to belong to the plaintiff, it must at once be handed over to the plaintiff when the matter becomes an adjudged matter.
§ 2. If the respondent is to furnish something mobile, to pay money, or to give or to do something else, the judge in the text of the sentence, or the executor with personal discretion and prudence is to set a time limit for fulfilling the obligation, which, however, is not to be less than fifteen days nor more than six months.
THE SUMMARY CONTENTIOUS TRIAL
§ 1. The summary contentious trial can be used in all cases that are not excluded by law, unless a party requests an ordinary contentious trial.
§ 2. If the summary contentious trial is used in cases excluded by law, the judicial acts are null.
§ 1. In addition to the points mentioned in can. 1187, the libellus introducing the suit must:
1° set forth briefly, fully and clearly the facts on which the plaintiff\’s plea is based;
2° indicate the proofs by which the plaintiff intends to demonstrate the facts and which cannot be brought forward with the libellus; this is to be done in such a way that the proofs can at once be gathered by the judge.
§ 2. Documents which support the plea must be added to the libellus introducing the suit, at least in authentic copy.
§ 1. If an attempt at reconciliation according to the norm of can. 1103, § 2, has been fruitless, the judge, if he believes that the libellus has some foundation, is to order within three days by a decree appended to the bottom of the libellus that a copy of the petition be notified to the respondent, granting the latter the right to send a written response to the chancery of the tribunal within fifteen days.
§ 2. This notification has the effect of the judicial summons mentioned in can. 1194.
If the exceptions raised by the respondent so require, the judge is to assign the plaintiff a time limit for a reply, so that from the material supplied by each party the judge can have a clear idea of the object of the controversy.
§ 1. When the time limits mentioned in cann. 1345, § 1 and 1346 have expired, the judge, after having examined the acts, is to determine the formulation of the doubt; next, the judge is to summon to a hearing to be held within thirty days, all who must be present at it; the judge is to attach the formulation of the doubt to the summons for the parties.
§ 2. In the citation the parties are to be informed that they can present to the tribunal a brief written statement in support of their allegations at least three days prior to the hearing.
At the hearing the questions mentioned in cann. 1118, 1119, 1121, and 1122 are to be treated first.
§ 1. The proofs are collected at the hearing with due regard for the prescriptions of can. 1071.
§ 2. The party and his or her advocate can be present at the examination of the other parties, of the witnesses, and of the experts.
The responses of the parties, witnesses, and experts, and the petitions and exceptions of the advocates must be put in writing by the notary but in a summary fashion and only as regards those matters which pertain to the substance of the controverted matter, and they must be signed by those making depositions.
Only in accordance with the norm of can. 1110 can the judge admit proofs which have not been presented or asked for in the petition or the response; however, after even a single witness has been heard, the judge can decree new proofs only in accordance with the norm of can. 1283.
If all the proofs cannot be collected at the hearing, a second hearing is to be scheduled.
When the proofs have been collected, the oral discussion takes place at the same hearing.
§ 1. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge is to decide the case forthwith, unless it emerges from the discussion that something needs to be added to the instruction of the case, or that there is something that prevents the sentence being given according to the norm of law. The dispositive part of the sentence is to be read out immediately in the presence of the parties.
§ 2. Because of the difficulty of the matter, or for some other just cause, the decision of the tribunal can be deferred for up to five usable days.
§ 3. The full text of the sentence, including the reasons for it, is to be intimated to the parties as soon as possible, normally not beyond fifteen days.
If the appellate tribunal perceives that in the lower grade of the trial, the summary contentious trial was used in a case excluded by law, it must declare the sentence null and remand the case to the tribunal which delivered the judgement.
In all other matters concerning the manner of procedure, the canons about the ordinary contentious trials are to be observed. In order to expedite matters, however, while safeguarding justice, the tribunal can, by a decree giving reasons, forego observing the procedural norms which are not prescribed for validity.
CERTAIN SPECIAL PROCESSES
CASES TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
1° THE COMPETENT FORUM
Any marriage case whatever of a baptized person belongs to the Church by its own right.
Without prejudice to personal Statutes where they are in force, cases concerning the merely civil effects of marriage pertain to the civil judge, if these civil effects are the principal object of the case; but if these are incidental and accessory, the cases can be heard and decided also by the ecclesiastical judge by proper authority.
In cases regarding the nullity of marriage which are not reserved to the Apostolic See the following are competent:
1° the tribunal of the place where the marriage was celebrated;
2° the tribunal of the place where the respondent has a domicile or quasi-domicile;
3° the tribunal of the place where the plaintiff has a domicile, provided that both parties live in the territory of the same nation and the judicial vicar of the domicile of the respondent agrees, after hearing the respondent;
4° the tribunal of the place in which de facto most of the proofs are to be collected provided that the judicial vicar of the domicile of the respondent agrees after hearing the respondent.
2° THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE A MARRIAGE
The following are capable of challenging a marriage:
1° the spouses;
2° the promoter of justice when the nullity has already been made public, and the marriage cannot be convalidated or it is not expedient to do so;
§ 1. A marriage which was not challenged during the lifetime of both spouses cannot be challenged after the death of either or both of the spouses unless the question of validity is prejudicial to the resolution of another controversy either in the canonical forum or in the civil forum.
§ 2. However, if a spouse dies while a case is pending, can. 1199 is to be observed.
3° THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE JUDGES AND TRIBUNAL
Before accepting a case and whenever there seems to be hope of a successful outcome, the judge is to use pastoral means to persuade the spouses, if it is possible, to convalidate the marriage and to resume the partnership of conjugal life.
§ 1. When the libellus introducing the suit has been admitted, the presiding judge or the ponens is to proceed to the intimation of the decree of summons in accordance with the norms of can. 1191.
§ 2. If, within fifteen days of the intimation, neither party has requested a session for the joinder of the issue, then within ten days the presiding judge or the ponens is, by a decree, to decide ex officio the formulation of the doubt or doubts and intimate the parties.
§ 3. The formulation of the doubt is not only to ask whether there is proof of the nullity of marriage in question, but it must also determine on what ground or grounds the validity of the marriage is being challenged.
§ 4. If the parties have not objected to this decree within ten days after its intimation, the presiding judge or the ponens is, by a new decree, to arrange for the hearing of the case.
§ 1. The defender of the bond, the legal representatives of the parties and, if involved in the trial, the promoter of justice, have the right:
1° to be present at the examination of the parties, the witnesses and the experts, without prejudice to can. 1240;
2° to inspect the judicial acts even if they are not yet published and to recognize the documents produced by the parties.
§ 2. The parties cannot attend the examination mentioned in § 1, n. 1.
Unless there are full independent proofs, in order to weigh the depositions of the parties in accordance with can. 1217, §2, the judge is, if possible, to hear witnesses to the credibility of the parties themselves, as well as gather other indications and supportive elements.
In cases of impotence or defect of consent due to mental illness, the judge is to use the services of one or more experts unless it is obvious from the circumstances that this would serve no purpose; in other cases the prescription of can. 1255 is to be observed.
During the hearing of a case, whenever a very probable doubt emerges that the marriage was not consummated, after suspending the nullity case with the consent of the parties, the tribunal can complete the hearing of the case for a dissolution of a non-consummated sacramental marriage; the acts are to be sent to the Apostolic See together with a petition for this dissolution from either or both spouses and with the votum of the tribunal and the eparchial bishop.
5° THE SENTENCE AND THE APPEAL
§ 1. The sentence which first declared the nullity of the marriage together with the appeals if there are any and the other acts of the trial, are to be sent ex officio to the appellate tribunal within twenty days from the intimation of the sentence.
§ 2. If the sentence was rendered in favour of the nullity of marriage in the first grade of trial, the appellate tribunal by its own decree is to confirm the decision without delay or admit the case to an ordinary examination of a new grade of trial, after considering the observations of the defender of the bond and those of the parties if there are any.
If at the appellate level a new ground of nullity of the marriage is offered, the tribunal can admit it and judge it as if in the first instance.
§ 1. After the judgement which first declared the nullity of marriage has been confirmed at the appellate level either by decree or by another judgement, those whose marriage has been declared null may celebrate a new marriage as soon as the decree or the second judgement has been intimated to them, unless there is a prohibition attached to the judgement or decree itself, or imposed by the local hierarch.
Immediately after the sentence has been executed, the judicial vicar must notify the hierarch of the place in which the marriage was celebrated about this. That hierarch must take care that notation be made quickly in the matrimonial and baptismal registers concerning the nullity of the marriage and any prohibitions which may have been determined.
6° THE DOCUMENTARY PROCESS
§1. The nullity of a marriage may be declared by a sentence by the judicial vicar or a judge designated by him on the basis of a document which is not open to any contradiction or exception but furnishes certain proof of the existence of a diriment impediment or a defect of form for the celebration of marriage prescribed by law. In this case, when the petition has been admitted, the formalities of the ordinary process may be omitted, but the parties must be summoned. And with the intervention of the defender of the bond, the sentence of nullity may be pronounced, provided it is equally certain that no dispensation was granted or that the proxy had no valid mandate.
§ 2. However, in the case of a person who was obliged to observe the form for the celebration of marriage prescribed by law, but who attempted marriage before a civil official or a non-Catholic minister, the pre-nuptial investigation mentioned in can. 784 suffices to prove his or her free status.
§ 1. If the defender of the bond prudently deems that either the defects or the lack of a dispensation are not certain, he or she must appeal from the judgement mentioned in can. 1372, §1 to the judge of the tribunal of the second grade. The acts must be sent to this appeal judge, who must be informed in writing that it is a documentary process.
§ 2. The party who feels aggrieved retains the right of appeal.
The judge of the tribunal of second grade, with the intervention of the defender of the bond and after hearing the parties, is to decide whether the judgement is to be confirmed or whether the case should proceed according to the ordinary course of law. In this latter event the judge is to remand the case to the tribunal of first grade.
7° GENERAL NORMS
Cases declaring the nullity of marriage cannot be treated in a summary contentious process.
In other procedural matters, the canons on trials in general and on the ordinary contentious trial are to be applied unless the nature of the matter precludes it; however, the special norms on cases affecting the public good are to be observed.
In the judgement the parties are to be admonished of the moral obligations, indeed possibly even of civil ones, by which they are bound towards each other and to their children in the matter of maintenance and the upbringing of the latter.
CASES OF SEPARATION OF SPOUSES
§ 1. Unless lawfully provided otherwise for particular places, the personal separation of spouses can be decided by a decree of the eparchial bishop, or by the judgement of a judge.
§ 2. Where an ecclesiastical decision does not produce civil effects, or if it is foreseen that the civil judgement will not be contrary to divine law, the eparchial bishop of the eparchy where the spouses are staying can, after weighing the special circumstances, give them permission to approach the civil forum.
§ 3. Also, if a case is concerned only with the merely civil effects of marriage, the judge is to endeavour, with the permission of the eparchial bishop, to have the case deferred to the civil forum from the very beginning.
§ 1. Unless one party seeks an ordinary contentious process, a summary contentious process is to be used.
§ 2. If the ordinary contentious process has been used and an appeal is proposed, the appellate tribunal, after hearing the parties, is to proceed by its decree whether to confirm the decision or admit the case to an ordinary examination in the second degree.
As regards the competence of the tribunal, can. 1359, nn. 2 and 3 are to be observed.
Before accepting the case and whenever there seems to be hope of a successful outcome, the judge is to use pastoral means to persuade the spouses to be reconciled and to resume the partnership of conjugal life.
In cases of separation of spouses, the promoter of justice must intervene in accordance with the norm of can. 1097.
PROCESS IN THE PRESUMED DEATH OF A SPOUSE
§ 1. Whenever the death of a spouse cannot be proven by an authentic ecclesiastical or civil document, the other spouse is not to be considered free from the bond of marriage until after a declaration is issued by the eparchial bishop that death is presumed.
§ 2. The eparchial bishop can issue this declaration only after making suitable investigations, he has reached moral certainty concerning the death of the spouse from the depositions of witnesses, from hearsay, or from indications. The mere absence of the spouse, even for a long time, is not sufficient.
§ 3. In uncertain and complex cases, an eparchial bishop exercising his power within the territorial boundaries of a patriarchal Church is to consult the patriarch; other eparchial bishops are to consult the Apostolic See.
§ 4. In the process concerning the presumption of death of a spouse, the intervention of the promoter of justice is required, but not that of the defender of the bond.
THE PROCESS FOR OBTAINING A DISSOLUTION OF A NON-CONSUMMATED MARRIAGE OR THE DISSOLUTION OF A MARRIAGE IN FAVOR OF THE FAITH
In order to obtain the dissolution of a non-consummated marriage or the dissolution of a marriage in favour of the faith, the special norms issued by the Apostolic See are to be strictly observed.
CASES FOR DECLARING THE NULLITY OF SACRED ORDINATION
The cleric himself, the hierarch to whom he is subject, or the hierarch in whose eparchy he was ordained have the right to impugn the validity of sacred ordination.
§ 1. The libellus to impugn the validity of sacred ordination must be sent to the competent dicastery of the Roman Curia, which will determine whether the case is to be dealt with by it or by a tribunal designated by it.
§ 2. If the dicastery remits the case to a tribunal, the canons on trials in general and on the ordinary contentious trial are to be observed, unless the nature of the matter precludes this; the canons on the summary contentious process cannot, however, be used.
§ 3. Once the libellus has been sent, the cleric is ipso iure forbidden to exercise sacred orders.
After a second judgement confirming the nullity of sacred ordination, the cleric loses all rights proper to the clerical state and is freed from all its obligations.
THE PROCEDURE IN THE REMOVAL OR TRANSFER OF PASTORS
In the removal or transfer of parish priests, cann. 1389-1400 are to be observed, unless a different procedure is laid down by the particular law approved by the Apostolic See.
THE MANNER OF PROCEEDING IN REMOVING PASTORS
When the ministry of any parish priest has for some reason become harmful or at least ineffective, even though this occurs without any serious fault on his part, he can be removed from the parish by the eparchial bishop.
The reasons for which a parish priest can lawfully be removed from his parish are principally:
1° a manner of acting which causes grave harm or disturbance to ecclesiastical communion;
2° ineptitude or permanent illness of mind or body, which makes the parish priest unequal to the task of fulfilling his duties satisfactorily;
3° the loss of the parish priest\’s good name among upright and serious-minded parishioners, or aversion to him, when it can be foreseen that these factors will not quickly come to an end;
4° grave neglect or violation of parochial duties which persists after a warning;
5° bad administration of temporal goods with grave harm to the Church, when no other remedy can be found to eliminate this harm.
§ 1. If after an inquiry has been conducted, it is proven that a reason is present, the eparchial bishop is to discuss the matter with two parish priests from the group of parish priests stably selected for this by the presbyteral council, at the proposal of the eparchial bishop; but if subsequently he decides that the removal must take place, he must, for validity, indicate to the parish priest the reason and the arguments, and persuade him in a fatherly manner to resign his parish within fifteen days.
§ 2. The parish priest who is a member of a religious institute or a society of common life in the manner of religious can be removed either at the discretion of the eparchial bishop after having notified the major superior or by the major superior after having notified the eparchial bishop, without the need of each other\’s consent.
A resignation by a parish priest can be submitted conditionally provided that this can be legitimately accepted by the eparchial bishop and is actually accepted.
§ 1. If the parish priest has not answered within the prescribed days the eparchial bishop is to repeat the invitation extending the usable time for response.
§ 2. If it is clear to the eparchial bishop that the parish priest has received the second invitation but has not replied, even though not prevented from doing so by any impediment, or if the parish priest refuses to resign and gives no reasons for this, the eparchial bishop is to issue a decree of removal.
But if the parish priest opposes the case put forward and the reasons given in it, but advances arguments which appear insufficient to the eparchial bishop, to act validly the eparchial bishop must:
1° invite him to inspect the acts of the case and put together his objections in a written answer, indeed produce contrary proofs if he has any;
2° after this, complete the hearing of the case, and if this is necessary, and weigh the matter with the same two parish priests mentioned in can. 1391, § 1, unless, because of some impossibility on their part, others are to be designated;
3° finally, decide whether or not the parish priest is to be removed, and without delay issue the appropriate decree.
When the parish priest has been removed, the eparchial bishop is to ensure that he is either assigned to another office, if he is suitable for one, or is given a pension in so far as the case requires this and the circumstances permit.
§ 1. A parish priest who has been removed must abstain from exercising the office of parish priest, leave the parochial house free as soon as possible, and hand over everything pertaining to the parish to the person to whom the eparchial bishop has entrusted it.
§ 2. If there is question of a sick man who cannot be transferred elsewhere from the parochial house without inconvenience, the eparchial bishop is to leave to him the use, even the exclusive use, of the parochial house for as long as this necessity lasts.
§ 3. While recourse against a decree of removal is pending, the eparchial bishop cannot appoint a new parish priest, but is to make provision in the meantime by way of a parish administrator.
THE MANNER OF PROCEEDING IN THE TRANSFER OF PASTORS
If the good of souls or the necessity or advantage of the Church may demand that a parish priest be transferred from his parish, which he governs satisfactorily, to another parish or another office, the eparchial is to propose the transfer to him in writing and persuade him to consent, for the love of God and of souls.
If the parish priest does not intend to acquiesce in the eparchial bishop\’s advice and persuasion, he is to give his reasons in writing.
§ 1. If, despite the reasons put forward, the eparchial bishop judges that his proposition is not to be withdrawn, he is to weigh the reasons which favour and which oppose the transfer together with the two parish priests chosen in accordance with can. 1391, §1. If the bishop still considers that the transfer should proceed, he is to renew his fatherly exhortations to the parish priest.
§ 2. If, after these things have been done, the parish priest still refuses and the eparchial bishop thinks that the transfer must be made, he is to issue a decree of transfer stating that the parish shall be vacant after the lapse of a determined time.
§ 3. If this period of time has elapsed without result, the eparchial bishop is to declare the parish vacant.
In the case of transfer, can. 1396, acquired rights, and equity are to be observed.
PENAL SANCTIONS IN THE CHURCH
DELICTS AND PENALTIES IN GENERAL
Whereas it is in God\’s plan to use every means to lead back the erring sheep, those who have received from Him the power to loose and to bind are to use argument, reproof and appeal, never failing in patience and in teaching, so as to apply suitable medicine to the sickness of those who have offended. Indeed they are even to impose punishments with a view to healing the wounds caused by the offence, so that on the one hand the offenders are not driven to the precipice of despair nor on the other hand is loose rein given unto dissoluteness of life and contempt of the law.
§ 1. Every contrary custom being reprobated, a canonical penalty must be imposed through a penal trial prescribed in cann. 1468 1482, without prejudice to the coercive power of the judge in the instances mentioned expressly in the law.
§ 2. If, however, in the judgement of the authority spoken of in § 3, there are weighty reasons precluding a penal trial, and the proofs of the offence are certain, the offence can be punished by an extra-judicial decree in accordance with cann. 1486 and 1487, as long as it is not a case of a deprivation of office, title, insignia or a suspension for more than one year, demotion to a lower grade, deposition or major excommunication.
§ 3. Entitled to issue this decree are, besides the Apostolic See, within the limits of their competence, the patriarch, the major archbishop, the eparchial bishop and the major superior of an institute of consecrated life who has ordinary power of governance, all others being excluded.
§ 1. Even when it is a case of offences which carry by law an obligatory penalty, the hierarch can abstain from a penal process, and even abstain totally from imposing penalties, after having heard the promoter of justice, as long as in the judgement of the hierarch the following conditions simultaneously concur: the offender, who has not yet been brought to trial, moved by sincere repentance, has confessed his offence to the hierarch in the external forum, and adequate provision has been made to repair the scandal and the harm.
§ 2. However, the hierarch cannot do this when it is an offence which carries a penalty whose remission is reserved to a higher authority, until he has received permission from the same authority.
§ 1. In the matter of punishments, the more benign interpretation is to be made.
§ 2. It is not allowed to extend a penalty from one person to another, or from one case to another, although there is equal or even weightier reason.
§ 1. Whoever has legislative power can also issue penal laws in so far as they are truly necessary to provide more aptly for ecclesiastical discipline; he can also by his own laws strengthen with a suitable penalty divine law or ecclesiastical law enacted by higher authority, observing the territorial and personal limitations of his competence.
§ 2. Particular law may add additional penalties to the penalties established in common law for a certain offence, but this shall not be done except for a very serious reason. If, however, common law has established an indeterminate or facultative penalty, particular law can establish in its place a determinate or obligatory penalty.
§ 3. Patriarchs and eparchial bishops shall take care that particular penal laws be uniform in the same territory, to the extent that this is possible.
§ 1. To the extent that someone can impose precepts, he can, after mature reflection and with utmost moderation, threaten by precept determinate penalties, with the exception of those enumerated in can. 1402, § 2. The patriarch, however, can threaten even these penalties by precept with the consent of the permanent synod.
§ 2. A warning containing the threat of penalties by which the hierarch sanctions a non-penal law in indivudual cases, is equivalent to a penal precept.
§ 1. If, in the judgement of the hierarch who can inflict a penalty, the nature of the offence permits it, the penalty cannot be imposed unless the offender has been warned at least once in advance to desist from the offence, with adequate time given for reconsideration.
§ 2. One is to be said to have desisted from the offence who has sincerely repented the misdeed, and has in addition given adequate reparation of the scandal and of the harm, or has at least seriously promised to do it.
§ 3. The penal warning mentioned in can. 1406 § 2 suffices for the imposition of the penalty.
A penalty does not bind the guilty party before it has been imposed by a sentence or decree, without prejudice to the right of the Roman Pontiff or an Ecumenical Council to determine otherwise.
§ 1. In the application of penal law, even when the law is expressed in preceptive terms, the judge, in accord with his own conscience and prudence, can:
1° defer the imposition of the penalty to a more appropriate time, if it is foreseen that greater harm will ensue from a hasty punishment of the guilty party;
2° abstain from imposing a penalty or impose a lighter penalty if the offender has reformed and reparation of the scandal and harm has been adequately provided, or if the guilty party has been or, it is foreseen, will be sufficiently punished by civil authority;
3° moderate the penalties within equitable limits if the guilty party committed several offences, and the cumulative burden of the penalties appears excessive;
4° suspend the obligation of observing the penalty in favour of him who has committed an offence for the first time, after having been commended heretofore by an upright life, as long as the need to repair scandal is not pressing. The suspended penalty is lifted entirely if the guilty party has not repeated the offence within the time set by the judge; otherwise such a one shall be more severly punished as the prepetrator of both offences, unless in the meantime time has run out for initiating a penal action for the prior offence.
§ 2. If the penalty is indeterminate and the law does not provide otherwise, the judge cannot impose the penaltes mentioned in can. 1402 § 2.
The imposition of penalties on a cleric must preserve for him what is necessary for a suitable livelihood, unless it is a case of deposition. In this case, the hierarch is to see to it that if the person who has been deposed is truly in need because of the punishment, he is provided for in the best way possible. To be ensured always are his rights arising from insurance and social security as well as health welfare in his regard and, if he is married, that of his family.
No penalty can be imposed after penal action has become extinct.
§ 1. One who is bound by the law or a precept is also subject to the penalty attached to it.
§ 2. If the law is changed after the offence was committed, the law more favourable to the accused is to be applied.
§ 3. If the subsequent law abolishes the law or at least the penalty, it ceases at once irrespective of the manner in which it had been imposed.
§ 4. The penalty binds the guilty party everywhere even after the authority of the one who has imposed the penalty has lapsed, unless it is expressly provided otherwise in common law.
§ 1. One who has not completed the fourteenth year of age is not subject to any penalty.
§ 2. Those, however, who have committed an offence between their fourteenth and eighteenth year of age can be punished only with penalties which do not include the loss of some good, unless the eparchial bishop or the judge decides in special cases that their reformation can be better provided for otherwise.
§ 1. Only those are subject to penalties who have violated a penal law or a penal precept, either by deliberate action or by seriously culpable omission of due diligence, or by seriously culpable ignorance of the law or precept.
§ 2. Once the external violation of a penal law or penal precept has occurred, it is presumed that it was a deliberate act, until the contrary is proven. In respect to other laws or precepts this is presumed only if the law or precept is violated again after a penal warning.
If in accordance with common practice and canonical doctrine there is present an extenuating circumstance, the judge must mitigate the penalty established in law or precept, as long as there is still an offence. Guided by his prudence, he can also abstain from imposing a penalty if he judges that one can better achieve by other means the reformation of the offender and the reparation of the harm and scandal.
When an offence was committed by a recidivist, or if according to common practice and canonical doctrine there is another aggravating circumstance, the judge can punish the offender more severely than foreseen in the law or precept, not excluding the penalties mentioned in can. 1402, § 2.
when persons conspire together to commit an offence, and accomplices are not expressly mentioned in the law or precept, they can be punished with the same penalties as the principal offender, or, according to the prudence of the judge, by other penalties of the same or lesser gravity.
§ 1. One who in order to commit an offence did something, or failed to do something, but then nevertheless, despite his intention, did not complete the offence, is not held by the penalty established for the consummated offence, unless the law or the precept provides otherwise.
§ 2. If, however, the actions or omissions by their nature lead to the execution of the offence, the perpetrator is to be punished by an appropriate penalty-especially if it resulted in scandal or other serious harm. Nevertheless, the penalty is to be more lenient than the one prescribed for a completed offence.
§ 3. One who spontaneously had desisted from the execution of an initiated offence is free of any penalty if no harm or scandal ensued from the attempt.
§ 1. One who can dispense from a penal law or can exempt someone from a penal precept, can also remit the penalty imposed in virtue of the same law or precept.
§ 2. In addition, the power of remitting penalties can also be granted to others by the law or penal precept.
§ 1. A penalty imposed in virtue of common law can be remitted by:
1° the hierarch who has initiated the penal trial or has imposed the penalty by decree;
2° the hierarch of the place where the guilty party lives, but after consultation with the hierarch mentioned in n. 1.
§ 2. These norms apply also in respect to penalties imposed in virtue of particular law or a penal precept, unless the particular law of a Church sui iuris provides otherwise.
§ 3. A penalty, however, imposed by the Apostolic See can be remitted only by the Apostolic See, unless the remitting of the penalty is delegated to the patriarch or to others.
The remitting of a penalty extorted by force, grave fear or trickery is ipso iure null.
§ 1. A penalty can be remitted even if the matter is unknown, or even under condition.
§ 2. The remission must be given in writing unless a serious reason suggests otherwise.
§ 3. Care shall be taken that the petition for remission of the penalty or the remission itself not be made public, unless this is either useful for protecting the good name of the offender or necessary for repairing the scandal.
§ 1. Without prejudice to the right of the Roman Pontiff to reserve to himself or others the remission of any penalty, the synod of bishops of the patriarchal Church or of the major archiepiscopal Church can, because of grave circumstances, enact laws and reserve the remission of penalties to the patriarch or to the major archbishop. Such laws will be binding on their subjects who have a domicile or quasi-domicile within the territorial boundaries of the Church over which they preside. No one else can validly reserve to himself or to others the remission of penalties established by common law, except with the consent of the Apostolic See.
§ 2. Every reservation is to be interpreted strictly.
§ 1. The remission of a penalty cannot be granted unless the guilty party has sincerely repented, and, moreover, suitable provisions have been made to repair the scandal and harm.
§ 2. If, however, in the judgement of him who is competent to remit the penalty, these conditions have been fulfilled the remission is not to be denied, in so far as this is possible considering the nature of the penalty.
If someone is bound by several penalties, the remission is valid only in respect to penalties expressly mentioned in it; but a general remission removes all penalties except those which the guilty party in bad faith has concealed in the petition.
§ 1. Unless another penalty is provided in the law, according to the ancient traditions of the Eastern Churches, penalties can be imposed which require some serious work of religion or piety or charity, such as certain prayers, a pious pilgrimage, a special fast, alms, spiritual retreats.
§ 2. Other penalties are to be imposed on one who is not disposed to accept these penalties.
§ 1. Without prejudice to particular law, a public reprimand is to be administered either before a notary or two witnesses or by letter, but in such a way that the reception and the contents of the letter are provable through some document.
§ 2. Care must be taken that the public reprimand does not occasion more than normal loss of the good name of the guilty party.
If the seriousness of the case demands it and especially if it concerns recidivists, the hierarch can, in addition to the penalties imposed by a sentence according to the law, submit the offender to vigilance in the manner determined by an administrative decree.
§ 1. The prohibition to stay in a certain place or territory can affect only clerics or religious or members of societies of common life in the manner of religious. An injunction to stay in a certain place or territory can affect only clerics ascribed to an eparchy, without prejudice to the law of institutes of consecrated life.
§ 2. To impose an injunction to stay in a certain place or territory, the consent of the local hierarch is required, unless it is either in a house of an institute of consecrated life of pontifical or patriarchal law or in a plurieparchial house for the penance and rehabilitation of clerics. In the former case, the consent of the competent superior is required.
§ 1. Penal deprivations can affect only those powers, offices, ministries, functions, rights, privileges, faculties, benefits, titles, insignia, which are subject to the power of the authority that establishes the penalty, or of the hierarch who initiated the penal trial or imposed it by decree; the same applies to penal transfer to another office.
§ 2. Deprivation of the power of sacred orders is not possible, but only a prohibition against exercising all or some acts of orders, in accordance with common law; nor is deprivation of academic degrees possible.
§ 1. Those punished with a minor excommunication are deprived of the reception of the Divine Eucharist. Besides they can be excluded from participation in the Divine Liturgy, and even from entering churches where divine worship is publicly celebrated.
§ 2. The sentence or the decree by which this penalty is imposed must determine the extent of the penalty and, if the case suggests it, its duration.
§ 1. A suspension can refer to all or some acts of the power of orders or of governance, to all or some acts or rights connected with an office, ministry or function; the extension of the suspension is to be defined in the sentence or decree itself, unless it is already determined in the law.
§ 2. Nobody can be suspended except from acts which are subject to the power of the authority that imposes the penalty or of the hierarch who initiated the penal process or inflicts the suspension by a decree.
§ 3. A suspension never affects the validity of acts nor the right to a dwelling place which the offender may have by reason of an office, ministry or function. A suspension forbidding, however, the reception of revenues, remuneration, pensions, or anything else, carries with it the obligation of restoring whatever was illegitimately received even in good faith.
§ 1. A cleric demoted to a lower grade is forbidden to exercise those acts of the power of order or governance which are not in accord with this grade.
§ 2. A cleric deposed from the clerical state is derived of all offices, ministries or other functions, ecclesiastical pensions and any delegated power; he becomes disqualified for them; he is forbidden to exercise the power of orders; he cannot be promoted to higher holy orders, and is equivalent to lay persons in respect to canonical effects, without prejudice to cann. 396 and 725.
§ 1. In addition to all things mentioned in can. 1431, § 1, a major excommunication forbids one to receive other sacraments, to administer sacraments and sacramentals, to exercise any offices, ministries and functions, to place acts of governance, which, if they are nonetheless placed, are ipso iure null.
§ 2. One punished with a major excommunication is to be turned away from participating in the Divine Liturgy and in other public celebrations of divine worship.
§ 3. One punished with a major excommunication is forbidden to make use of privileges previously granted. He cannot validly obtain dignities, offices, ministries, or any other function in the Church or a pension, and he cannot acquire the revenues attached to them. Moreover, he is deprived of active and passive voice.
§ 1. If the penalty forbids the reception of sacraments or sacramentals, the prohibition is suspended while the guilty party is in danger of death.
§ 2. If the penalty forbids the administration of sacraments or sacramentals or the placing of an act or governance, the prohibition is suspended whenever this is necessary to provide for the needs of the Christian faithful who are in danger of death.
PENALTIES FOR INDIVIDUAL DELICTS
§ 1. One who denies a truth which must be believed with divine and catholic faith, or who calls it into doubt, or who totally repudiates the Christian faith, and does not retract it after having been legitimately warned, is to be punished as a heretic or an apostate with a major excommunication; a cleric moreover can be punished with other penalties, not excluding deposition.
§ 2. In addition to these cases, whoever professes a doctrine that has been condemned as erroneous by the Roman Pontiff or the college of bishops exercising the authentic magisterium, and does not retract it after having been legitimately warned, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
One who evades subjection to the supreme authority of the Church or communion with Christ\’s faithful subject to it and, though lawfully warned, does not obey, is to be punished as a schismatic with major excommunication.
One who deliberately omits the commemoration of the hierarch in the Divine Liturgy and in the liturgy of the hours as prescribed by law, and does not change his mind, though lawfully warned, is to be punished with a suitable penalty, not excluding major excommunication.
Parents and those who take the place of parents, who present children to be baptized or raised in a non-Catholic religion, are to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
One who violates the norms of law concerning communicatio in sacris can be punished with an appropriate penalty.
Whoever employs sacred objects for profane use or for an evil purpose, is to be suspended or forbidden to receive the Divine Eucharist.
Whoever has thrown away the Divine Eucharist or taken or retained it for a sacrilegious purpose, is to be punished with a major excommunication and, if he is a cleric, also with other penalties, not excluding deposition.
One who has simulated the celebration of the Divine Liturgy or other sacraments, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty, not excluding a major excommunication.
One who has committed perjury before an ecclesiastical authority or who, though not under oath, knowingly stated falsehood to a judge during a lawful hearing, or concealed the truth, or one who induced to commit these offences, is to be punished with a suitable penalty.
§ 1. One who dealt physical violence to a bishop or has inflicted some other grave affront, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty, not excluding deposition, if he is a cleric. If, however, the same offence was committed against a metropolitan, a patriarch, or indeed the Roman Pontiff, the offender is to be punished with major excommunication, which in the last case is reserved to the Roman Pontiff himself to remit.
§ 2. One who did the same to another cleric, religious, member of a society of common life in the manner of religious, or to a lay person who currently exercises an ecclesiastical function, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
One who disobeys one\’s hierarch\’s lawful order or prohibition, and who, after warning, persists in disobedience, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty as one guilty of an offence.
§ 1. One who incites sedition or hatred toward any hierarch whatever or calls his subjects to disobey him, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty, not excluding major excommunication, especially if the offence was committed against a patriarch or indeed against the Roman Pontiff.
§ 2. To be punished with an appropriate penalty are:
1° anyone who obstructed the freedom of ministry or of election or of ecclesiastical authority or the lawful use of the temporal goods of the Church;
2° anyone who intimidated an elector or one exercising power or ministry.
§ 1. One who uses a public performance or talk or publicly disseminated writing, or other media of communication, to blaspheme, seriously harm good morals, injure religion or the Church, or incite hatred or contempt for religion or the Church, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
§ 2. One who joins an organization which plots against the Church, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
One who has alienated ecclesiastical property without the prescribed consent or permission, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
§ 1. One who committed homicide is to be punished with major excommunication; a cleric is to be punished in addition with other penalties, not excluding deposition.
§ 2. One who procured abortion effectively is to be punished in the same manner, with due regard for can. 728, § 2.
One who abducted or unjustly detains a person, or gravely wounded or mutilated, or inflicted bodily or mental torture on a person, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty, not excluding major excommunication.
Whoever has caused serious injury to another or seriously harmed another\’s good name with a calumny, is to be compelled to give appropriate satisfaction; but if such a person refuses, that person is to be punished with minor excommunication or suspension.
§ 1. A cleric who lives in concubinage or otherwise lives in an external sin against chastity causing scandal, is to be punished with suspension. If he persists in the offence, other penalties can be gradually added up to deposition.
§ 2. A cleric who attempted a forbidden marriage is to be deposed.
§ 3. A religious who has taken public, perpetual vow of chastity and is not in holy orders, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty if he or she is guilty of these offences.
One who has falsely accused someone of an offence, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty, not excluding a major excommunication, especially if the accused is a confessor, hierarch, cleric, religious, member of a society of common life in the manner of religious, or a lay person appointed to an ecclesiastical function (munus), with due regard for can. 731.
One who falsified an ecclesiastical document or asserted a falsehood in it or who knowingly made use of a false or falsified document in an ecclesiastical matter, or who changed, destroyed or concealed a true document, shall be punished with an appropriate penalty.
§ 1. A confessor who has directly violated the seal of confession, is to be punished with a major excommunication, with due regard for can. 728, § 1, n. 1; but if he broke the seal in another manner, he is to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
§ 2. One who has attempted in any way to gain information from confession, or who has given such information to others, shall be punished with a minor excommunication or suspension.
A priest who has absolved an accomplice in a sin against chastity shall be punished with a major excommunication, with due regard for can. 728, § 1, n. 2.
A priest who in the act or on the occasion or under the pretext of confession has solicited a penitent to a sin against chastity, is to be punished with appropriate penalties, not excluding deposition.
§ 1. Bishops who have conferred episcopal ordination upon someone without a mandate of competent authority, and the one who accepted ordination from them in this manner, are to be punished with a major excommunication.
§ 2. A bishop who has conferred diaconal or presbyteral ordination upon someone against the prescriptions of the canons, is to be punished with a major excommunication.
One who has approached the civil authority directly or indirectly to obtain through its influence sacred ordination, an office, a ministry or another function in the Church, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty, not excluding major excommunication, and in case of a cleric, even deposition.
One who has conferred or accepted holy orders through simony, shall be deposed; but the one who has administered or received other sacraments through simony, shall be punished with an appropriate penalty, not excluding a major excommunication.
One who has obtained or conferred an office, a ministry or another function in the Church simoniacally is to be punished with an appropriate penalty, not excluding major excommunication. So, too, is to be punished one who usurped in any manner whatsoever, or unlawfully retains, or has transmitted to others or discharges an office, a ministry or another function in the Church.
One who has given or promised something in order that someone who exercises an office, a ministry or other function in the Church would unlawfully do or omit something is to be punished with an appropriate penalty, likewise the person who accepts such gifts or promises.
§ 1. One who, in addition to the cases already foreseen in law, has misused power, an office, a ministry or another function in the Church by action or omission, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty, not excluding their deprivation, unless another penalty has been established in law or precept for such an abuse.
§ 2. One, who out of culpable negligence, has unlawfully placed or omitted an act of ecclesiastical authority, office, ministry or other function in the Church, causing harm to another, is to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
One who, belonging to any Church sui iuris, including the Latin Church, and exercising an office, a ministry or another function in the Church, has presumed to induce any member of the Christian faithful whatever to transfer to another Church sui iuris, contrary to can. 31 is to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
A cleric, religious or member of a society of common life in the manner of religious who conducts business or trade against the prescriptions of the canons is to be punished with an appropriate penalty.
One who violates the obligations imposed by a penalty may be punished with a heavier penalty.
THE PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING PENALTIES
THE PENAL TRIAL
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
§ 1. Whenever the hierarch receives information about an offence, which at least has the semblance of truth, he is to enquire carefully, either personally or through some suitable person, about the facts and circumstances, unless this investigation appears to be entirely superfluous.
§ 2. Care must be taken lest anyone\’s good name be endangered by this investigation.
§ 3. The one who conducts the investigation has the same powers and obligations as an auditor in a process. If, later, a penal trial is initiated, this person cannot take part in it as a judge.
§ 1. With due regard for cann. 1403 and 1411, if the investigation seems sufficiently instructed, the hierarch is to decide whether the process for imposing a penalty is to be used and if he decides in the affirmative, whether the action is to be taken through a penal trial or through an extra-judicial decree.
§ 2. The hierarch is to revoke or change his decision whenever it appears to him from new facts and circumstances, that a different decision is called for.
§ 3. Before he decides anything in the matter, the hierarch is to hear the one accused of the offence and the promoter of justice and also, if he deems it prudent, two judges or others expert in law. The hierarch is also to consider whether, in order to avoid a pointless trial, it is expedient that either he or the investigator equitably make a decision about the question of damages with the consent of the parties.
The acts of the investigation, the decrees of the hierarch by which the investigation is opened and closed, and all that precedes it are to be kept in the secret archive of the curia if they are not necessary for the procedure for imposing penalties.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PENAL TRIAL
§ 1. With due regard for the canons of this title, unless otherwise indicated by the nature of the matter, the canons on trials in general and on the ordinary contentious trial are to be applied to the penal trial as well as the special norms on cases which involve the public good, not, however, the canons on the summary contentious trial.
§ 2. The accused is not bound to confess the offence and cannot be asked to take an oath.
§ 1. If the hierarch has decreed that a penal trial is to be begun, he is to hand over the acts of the investigation to the promoter of justice who is to present a libellus of accusation to the judge according to the norms of cann. 1185 and 1187.
§ 2. Before the higher tribunal, the promoter of justice constituted for that tribunal adopts the role of plaintiff.
At any stage and grade of the trial, in order to prevent scandal, protect the freedom of the witnesses and safeguard the course of justice, the hierarch can, after hearing the promoter of justice and after summoning the accused to appear, prohibit the accused from the exercise of sacred orders, an office, ministry or another function, can impose or forbid residence in a certain place or territory, or even prohibit the public reception of the Divine Eucharist. When the reason for all these measures ceases, they must be revoked and they cease ipso iure when the penal trial ends.
While summoning, the judge must invite the accused to engage an advocate within a determined time-limit. If it lapses without result, the judge is to appoint an advocate ex officio for the accused. This advocate shall remain in office as long as the accused has not appointed an advocate.
§ 1. At the order or with the consent of the hierarch who decided that the trial should be initiated, renunciation of the instance on the part of the promoter of justice is possible in any grade of the trial.
§ 2. For validity, the renunciation must be accepted by the accused unless declared absent from the trial.
Besides pleadings and observations given in writing, if there have been any, the discussion of the case must be carried out orally.
§ 1. At the discussion must be present the promoter of justice, the accused and his or her advocate, the harmed party mentioned in can. 1483, §1 and that person\’s advocate.
§ 2. It is for the tribunal to call the experts who collaborated with the case to the discussion, so that they can explain their views.
In the discussion of the case the accused has always the right to speak last, either in person or the advocate of the accused.
§ 1. When the discussion is completed, the tribunal is to pronounce the judgement.
§ 2. If from the discussion has emerged the need to gather new proofs, the tribunal is to postpone the decision of the case and gather new proofs.
The dispositive part of the judgement is to be published immediately, unless the tribunal for a grave reason decides that the decision is to be kept secret until the formal intimation of the judgement. This may never be deferred beyond a month from the day when the penal case was decided.
§ 1. The offender can appeal even if discharged by the judge only because the penalty was facultative or because the judge used the power mentioned in cann. 1409, §1 and 1415.
§ 2. The promoter of justice can appeal, if he or she deems that the reparation of scandal or the restitution of justice has not been sufficiently provided for.
If in any stage and grade of the penal trial, it becomes quite evident that the offence was not committed by the accused, the judge must declare this in a sentence and acquit the accused, even if it is at the same time clear that the period for penal action has elapsed.
ACTION FOR REPARATION OF DAMAGES
§ 1. In accordance with the norm of can. 1276, a party who has suffered harm from an offence can bring a contentious action for making good the damages in the actual penal trial itself.
§ 2. The intervention of the harmed party is no longer admitted if it was not made in the first grade of the penal trial.
§ 1. To avoid excessive delays in a penal trial, the judge can postpone a trial concerning damages until he has rendered a definitive judgement in the penal trial.
§ 2. The judge who has done this must, after giving judgement in the penal trial, hear the case concerning damages, even if the penal trial is still pending because of a proposed challenge to it, or even if the accused has been acquitted for a reason which does not take away the obligation of repairing the damages.
Even if the judgement given in a penal trial has become an adjudged matter, in no way does it create a right for a party who has suffered harm, unless this party has intervened in accordance with can. 1483.
IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES BY EXTRA-JUDICIAL DECREE
§ 1. For the validity of the decree by which a punishment is imposed, it is required that:
1° the accused be informed of the accusation and the proofs and be given the opportunity of fully exercising the right of self-defence, unless having been summoned according to the norm of law, the person has neglected to appear;
2° an oral discussion be held before the hierarch or his delegate and the accused with the promoter of justice and a notary present;
3° there be set forth in the decree itself the reasons in fact and in law on which the punishment is based.
§ 2. However the punishments mentioned in can. 1426, § 1 can be imposed without this procedure so long as they have been accepted in writing by the guilty party.
§ 1. Recourse against a decree by which a punishment is inflicted can be lodged with the competent higher authority within ten usable days after the decree has been intimated.
§ 2. This recourse suspends the force of the decree.
§ 3. There is no further recourse against the decision of the higher authority.
LAW, CUSTOM AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS
Laws come into existence by promulgation.
§ 1. Laws enacted by the Apostolic See are promulgated by publication in the official commentary Acta Apostolicae Sedis, unless another form of promulgation is prescribed in special cases. They begin to oblige after three months have passed from the date set down on that issue of the Acta, unless because of the nature of the matter they bind immediately or unless a shorter or a longer interval has been expressly determined.
§ 2. Laws enacted by other legislators are promulgated in the manner determined by these legislators, and begin to oblige from the date determined by them.
Merely ecclesiastical laws bind those baptized in the Catholic Church or received into it, who have sufficient use of reason and, unless the law itself expressly provides otherwise, who have completed their seventh year of age.
§ 1. Laws enacted by the supreme authority of the Church are binding everywhere on all those for whom they were issued, unless they were made for a particular territory. Other laws have force only in the territory where the authority that promulgated them exercises power of governance, unless otherwise provided by law or is clear from the nature of the matter.
§ 2. Subject to the laws enacted for a particular territory are those for whom they were issued and who have a domicile or quasi-domicile there and are actually staying there, without prejudice to § 3, n. 1.
§ 3. Peregrines:
1° are not bound by the laws of the particular ius of their own territory while they are absent from it, unless their violation causes harm in their own territory or unless the laws are personal ones;
2° are not bound by laws of the particular ius of the territory in which they find themselves, except for those laws which provide for public order, or determine the formalities of juridical acts, or concern immovable property located in that territory;
3° are bound, however, by the laws of common ius and the laws of the particular ius of their own Church sui iuris, even if the latter are not in force in their own territory, whereas these do not oblige them if they are not obligatory in the place where they find themselves.
§ 4. Vagi are bound by all the laws which are in force in the place where they find themselves.
Laws enacted by the supreme authority of the Church, in which the passive subject is not expressly indicated, affect the Christian faithful of the Eastern Churches only in so far as they treat matters of faith and morals or declarations of divine law or these Christian faithful are explicitly included in these laws or they grant a favour which contains nothing contrary to the Eastern rites.
§ 1. The term common law in this Code designates besides the laws and lawful customs of the entire Church also the laws and lawful customs common to all Eastern Churches.
§ 2. The term particular law designates all laws, lawful customs, statutes and other norms of law which are not common to the entire Church nor to all the Eastern Churches.
Laws deal with the future and not the past, unless specific provision is made in the laws concerning the past.
Only those laws which expressly state that an act is null or that a person is disqualified from acting are to be considered to be nullifying or disqualifying.
Laws, even nullifying and disqualifying ones, do not bind if there is a doubt of law. If there is a doubt of fact, however, hierarchs can dispense from them, though in cases of a reserved dispensation they may do so only if the authority to whom it is reserved is accustomed to grant it.
§ 1. Ignorance or error concerning invalidating or disqualifying laws does not hinder their effectiveness unless it is expressly determined otherwise.
§ 2. Ignorance or error about a law. a penalty, a fact concerning oneself, or a notorious fact concerning another is not presumed; it is presumed about a fact concerning another which is not notorious until the contrary is proven.
§ 1. Laws are authentically interpreted by the legislator and by the one to whom the legislator has granted the power to interpret them authentically.
§ 2. An authentic interpretation given in the form of a law has the same force as the law itself and must be promulgated. Furthermore, if such an interpretation merely declares what was certain in the words of the law in themselves, it has retroactive force; if it restricts or extends the law or if it explains a doubtful law, it is not retroactive.
§ 3. However, an interpretation contained in a judicial sentence or an administrative act in a particular matter does not have the force of law and binds only those persons and affects only those matters for which it was given.
Laws are to be understood according to the proper meaning of the words considered in their text and context; if the meaning still remains doubtful and obscure, then according to parallel passages, if there are any, the purpose and the circumstances of the law, and the mind of the legislator.
Laws which establish a penalty or restrict the free exercise of rights or which contain an exception to the law are subject to a strict interpretation.
If on some particular matter there is not an express provision of a law, then the question is to be decided, unless it is a penal one, in accordance with the canons of the synods and of the holy Fathers, lawful custom, the general principles of canon law applied with equity, ecclesiastical jurisprudence and the common and constant canonical doctrine.
§ 1. A later lex abrogates or derogates from an earlier one, if it expressly states so, or if it is directly contrary to it, or if it integrally reorders the whole subject matter of the earlier lex.
§ 2. A lex of common law, unless expressly provided otherwise in the lex itself, does not derogate from the lex of a particular law, nor does the lex of a particular law enacted for a Church sui iuris derogate from the more particular law in force in that Church.
In a case of doubt the revocation of a pre-existent law is not presumed, but later laws are to be related to earlier ones and in so far as it is possible, harmonized with them.
Civil law, to which the law of the Church remits, is to be observed in canon law with the same effects, insofar as it is not contrary to divine law and unless it is provided otherwise in canon law.
Phrasing in the masculine gender concerns also the feminine gender, unless it is provided otherwise in the law or is clear from the nature of the matter.
§ 1. A custom of the Christian community, to the extent that it corresponds to the action of the Holy Spirit in the ecclesial body, can obtain the force of law.
§ 2. No custom can in any way derogate from divine law.
§ 1. Only that custom can have the force of law which is reasonable and introduced by a community capable at least of receiving law, and has been the continuous and uncontested practice for the prescribed time determined by law.
§ 2. A custom which is expressly reprobated in law is not a reasonable one.
§ 3. A custom contrary to the current canon law or one which is apart (praeter legem) from canon law, obtains the force of law only when it has been legitimately observed for thirty continuous and complete years; only a centenary or immemorial custom can prevail over a canon which contains a clause forbidding future customs.
§ 4. Even before that time, a competent legislator can approve a custom as legitimate by his consent, even tacitly.
Custom is the best interpreter of laws.
A custom, whether contrary to or apart from a lex, is revoked by a contrary custom or lex; however, a lex does not revoke centennial or immemorial customs, unless it makes express mention of them. Regarding other customs, can. 1502, § 2 is applicable.
§ 1. Administrative acts can be performed, within the limits of their competence, by those who have executive power of governance, as well as by those who have received such a power explicitly or implicitly either ipso iure or by lawful delegation.
§ 2. Administrative acts are chiefly the following:
1° decrees, by which a decision is given or a canonical provision is made for a special case;
2° singular precepts, by which it is directly and lawfully imposed on a given person or persons to do something or to omit to do it, especially in order to enforce the observance of a law;
3° rescripts by which a privilege, a dispensation, a permission or another favour is granted.
An administrative act has effect from the moment when it is intimated or, in case of rescripts, from the time when the letter was issued. If the application of the administrative act is entrusted to an executor, it has effect at the time of execution.
An administrative act is to be understood in accord with the proper meaning of the words and the common usage of speech, and must not be extended to cases other than those actually expressed in it.
§ 2. In doubt, a strict interpretation is to be given to those administrative acts which concern litigation or threaten or inflict penalties, or restrict the rights of persons, or harm the acquired rights of others, or run counter to a law in favour of private persons; all other administrative acts are to be widely interpreted.
§ 3. In privileges, the interpretation must always be such that the person to whom the privilege has been granted does in fact receive some favour.
§ 4. Not only a dispensation, but also the very power of dispensing granted for a particular case is to be interpreted strictly.
§ 1. No administrative act is revoked by a contrary law (lex), unless it is provided otherwise in the law (lex) itself, or the law (lex) was enacted by an authority higher to the one who issued the administrative act.
§ 2. Unless it is expressly provided otherwise, an administrative act does not cease with the expiry of the authority of the one who issued it.
§ 3. The revocation of an administrative act by another administrative act of the competent authority takes effect only from the moment at which the person for whom it was issued is intimated.
§ 4. A dispensation capable of successive applications ceases also by the certain and complete cessation of the motivating reason.
§ 5. A singular decree or precept ceases to have force also by the cessation of the law (lex) for whose execution it was issued. A singular precept ceases also on the expiry of the authority of the one who issued it, unless it was imposed by a lawful document.
An administrative act which deals with the external forum, with due regard for cann. 1520, § 2 and 1527, is to be set forth in writing; likewise, if the administrative act is issued in commissorial form, its act of execution is to be in writing.
An administrative act, even in the case of a rescript issued motu proprio, has no effect in so far as it harms the acquired right of another, or is contrary to a law or an approved custom, unless the competent authority has expressly added a derogatory clause.
Conditions attached to administrative acts are considered to affect its validity only when they are expressed by the particles if, unless, provided that ( si, nisi, dummodo ) or by other words having the same meaning in a vernacular language.
PROCEDURE JOR ISSUING EXTRA-JUDICIAL DCCR\’ES
§ 1. Before issuing an extra-judicial decree the person in authority is to seek the necessary information and proofs; hear or consult those who should, by law, be heard or consulted; and also hear those whom the decree directly touches and especially those whose rights can be harmed.
§ 2. To petitioners and even to those who lawfully contradict, the person in authority is to disclose such information and proofs as may come to be known without the risk of any public or private harm, and present arguments that are possibly contrary, while giving them the possibility to respond even through an advocate, within the time-limit established by the same authority.
The person in authority is to issue a decree within sixty days from the receipt of a petition for the decree, unless another time-limit has been laid down by the particular law of his or her Church sui iuris. If this was not done, and the petitioner again makes a written request for the decree, on the thirtieth day from the reception of this petition, if even by then nothing has been done, the request is to be regarded as rejected as if the rejection took place that same day by a decree, so that a recourse against it can be lodged.
§ 1. The person who issues a decree is to keep in mind and aim at what is the best way to lead to the salvation of souls and the public good, observing the laws and lawful customs, justice and equity.
§ 2. The reasons are to be mentioned in the decree, at least in summary form. If for the danger of public or private harm, the reasons should not be made known, they are to be entered in a secret book and, if requested, shown to the one who is examining the recourse lodged against the decree.
§ 1. A decree has legal force when it has been intimated to the one to whom it is directed in the manner that is safest according to the laws and conditions of the place.
§ 2. If there is danger of a public or private harm so that the text of the decree cannot be given in writing, the ecclesiastical authority can order it to be read before two witnesses or before a notary to the person to whom it is directed. And an act of the proceedings is to be drawn up and signed by all present. The decree is thereafter considered to have been intimated.
§ 3. If the person to whom a decree is directed refuses its intimation or, though summoned in accordance with the norm of law to receive or hear the decree, did not appear without a just cause, in the evaluation of the author of the decree, or refused to sign the act of proceedings, the decree is considered to have been intimated.
THE EXECUTION OJ ADRNINISTRATIVE ADS
The executor of an administrative act cannot validly carry out this function before receiving a written mandate and establishing its authenticity and integrity, unless prior notice of this mandate has been conveyed to the executor by the authority who issued the administrative act.
§ 1. The executor of an administrative act to whom only the task of execution is entrusted, cannot refuse to execute it, unless it is quite clear that the act itself is null, or that it cannot for some other grave reason be sustained, or that the conditions attached to the administrative act itself have not been fulfilled. If, however, the execution of the administrative act appears to be inopportune, because of the circumstances of person or place, the executor is to desist from its execution and immediately inform the authority who issued the act.
§ 2. If in a rescript the granting of a favour is entrusted to an executor, it is for the executor to grant or refuse it according to his or her prudent judgement and conscience.
The executor of an administrative act must proceed in accordance with the norm of the mandate. If the executor has not fulfilled the conditions attached to the mandate for the validity of the act, or has not observed the substantial form of procedure, the execution is null.
The executor of an administrative act may, in his or her prudent judgement, substitute another for himself or herself, unless substitution was forbidden or the executor was chosen on personal considerations, or a particular person was determined as substitute. In these cases, however, the executor may entrust preparatory acts to another.
An administrative act can be executed also by the executor\’s successor in office, unless the first had been chosen on personal considerations.
If there has been any error in the execution of an administrative act, the executor may execute it again.
§ 1. The provisions laid down in the canons on rescripts apply also to the granting of favours by word of mouth, unless it is clearly established otherwise.
§ 2. A person who has been granted a favour orally is obliged to prove it whenever this is lawfully requested.
A rescript can be requested for another person, even without that person\’s consent. It is valid before that person\’s acceptance, unless the contrary is evident from the clauses attached.
§ 1. The withholding of the truth in the request does not hinder a rescript having force, provided that those things have been expressed which must be expressed for validity according to the style of the curia of the hierarch who grants the rescript.
§ 2. Nor does the statement of falsehood hinder, provided that at least one of the motivating reasons submitted is true.
§ 1. A favour which has been refused by a higher authority cannot be validly granted by a lower authority, unless the higher authority has consented expressly.
§ 2. A favour refused by one authority cannot be validly granted by another of equal competence or by a higher authority if no mention of the refusal is made in the petition.
§ 1. A privilege is a favour granted by a special act for the benefit of certain persons, either physical or juridical. It can be granted by the legislator, and by the one to whom the legislator has granted this power.
§ 2. Centennial or immemorial possession of a privilege gives rise to the presumption that it has been granted.
§1. A privilege is presumed to be perpetual.
§ 2. A privilege ceases:
1° if it is personal, by the extinction of the person to whom it was granted;
2° if it is real or local, with the complete destruction of the thing or place;
3° on the expiry of the time or the completion of the number of cases for which it was granted;
4° if in the judgement of the competent authority, with the passage of time the circumstances are so changed that the privilege has become harmful, or its use becomes unlawful.
§ 3. A local privilege revives if the place is restored within fifty years.
§ 1. No privilege ceases by renunciation, unless this has been accepted by the competent authority.
§ 2. Any physical persons can renounce a privilege granted on behalf of themselves alone.
§ 3. Physical persons cannot validly renounce a privilege which has been granted to some juridical person or has been granted by reason of the dignity of a place or thing. Nor is the juridical person itself at liberty to renounce a privilege granted to it, if the renunciation happens to be prejudicial to the Church or to others.
A privilege which is not burdensome for others does not cease through non-use or contrary use. If, however, the privilege causes inconvenience to others, it is lost if lawful prescription intervenes or tacit renunciation.
Whoever abuses the power given by privilege is to be warned by the hierarch. If the abuse is grave and the warning is of no avail, the hierarch is to deprive the person of the privilege which he himself had granted. If the privilege was granted by a higher authority, the hierarch is obliged to inform that authority.
§ 1. A dispensation, that is, the relaxation of a merely ecclesiastical law in a particular case, can be granted only for a just and reasonable cause, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case and the gravity of he law from which the dispensation is to be given; otherwise the dispensation is illicit and, unless it is given by the legislator himself or by an authority superior to him, it is also invalid.
§ 2. The spiritual good of the Christian faithful is a just and reasonable cause.
§ 3. When there is a doubt about the sufficiency of the cause, the dispensation is granted licitly and validly.
Laws, in so far as they define that which essentially constitutes juridical institutes or acts, or are laws pertaining to processes or penalties, are not subject to dispensation.
§ 1. The eparchial bishop can dispense in special cases from both the leges of common law and the leges of particular law of his Church sui iuris the Christian faithful over whom he exercises power in accordance with law, whenever he deems it conducive to their spiritual good, unless reservation has been made by the authority which enacted the laws (leges).
§ 2. If it is difficult to contact the authority which has reserved to itself a dispensation, and at the same time there is danger of grave harm in delay, any hierarch can dispense in special cases the Christian faithful over whom he exercises power in accordance with the norm of law, provided the dispensation is one which the said authority grants in the same circumstances, without prejudice to can. 396.
In respect of their subjects, even if these are outside the territory, those who have the power of dispensing can exercise it even if they themselves are outside their own territory; unless the contrary is expressly provided, they can exercise it also in respect of peregrines actually staying in the territory; they can exercise it too in respect of themselves.
PRESCRIPTION AND THE COMPUTATION OF TIME
The Church accepts prescription as it exists in the civil legislation as a means of acquiring or losing a subjective right and of freeing oneself from obligations, unless otherwise established by common law.
No prescription has any effect which is not grounded in good faith, not only at the beginning but through the entire course of the time required for prescription with due regard for the prescription of can. 1152.
The following are not affected by prescription:
1° rights and obligations which are of divine law;
2° rights which can be obtained only by apostolic privilege;
3° rights and obligations which bear directly on the spiritual life of Christ\’s faithful;
4° the certain and undoubted boundaries of ecclesiastical territories;
5° obligations and commitments concerning the celebration of the Divine Liturgy;
6° the canonical provision of an office which requires the exercise of a sacred order, in accordance with the norm of law;
7° the right of visitation and the obligation of obedience, so that persons in the Church could not be visited by no ecclesiastical authority and would no longer be subject to any authority.
COMPUTATION OF TIME
Time is to be reckoned in accordance with the norm of the following canons, unless otherwise expressly provided by law.
§1 . Continuous time means unbroken time.
§ 2. Usable time (tempus utile) means time which a person can so use to exercise or to pursue a right that it does not run when one is unaware, or when one is unable to act.
§ 1. In law, a day means the span of time consisting of twenty-four continuous hours, and it begins at . A week is a span of seven days; a month is a span of thirty days; and a year a period of three hundred and sixty-five days, unless it is stated that the month and the year are to be taken as in the calendar.
§ 2. If the time is continuous, the month and the year are always to be taken as in the calendar.
§ 1. The first day, from which the calculation begins, is not counted in the total, unless its beginning coincides with the beginning of the day, or unless the law expressly provides otherwise.
§ 2. The final day, with which the calculation ends, is counted in the total. If the total time is one or more months, one or more years, one or more weeks, the final day finishes on completion of the last day bearing the same number or, if the month does not have the same number, on completion of the last day of the month.